

**GHANA INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT**

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**ELECTORAL FEASIBILITY STUDY**

*Independent Presidential Candidacy — Ghana 2028*

**CLASSIFICATION  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

**PREPARED BY  
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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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This Electoral Feasibility Study provides an evidence-based analysis of the viability of an independent presidential candidacy in Ghana's 2028 General Election. It is intended to inform strategic planning and to provide prospective investors and supporters with the factual basis for their decision-making.

## KEY FINDING

An independent presidential victory in Ghana 2028 is achievable — but requires a fundamentally different strategy than any previous independent attempt. The mathematical pathway exists. It demands capturing 100% of the floating voter bloc (approximately 2.3 million votes), achieving significant party base defection (targeting 15–20% of soft NDC/NPP voters), and suppressing turnout among disillusioned party loyalists. This study maps each of these targets with precision.

## Summary of Findings

Finding	Assessment	Confidence
Winning vote target (2028)	6.0 – 6.5 million votes	High
Floating voter pool available	~2.3 million voters	High
Required party defection	1.8 – 2.2 million	Medium
Candidate recognition baseline	Subject to polling commission	TBD
Funding requirement	\$11.5M – \$18M USD	High
Timeline viability (3 years)	Achievable with immediate start	Medium-High
Historical precedent	No independent has won; multiple have run	High
Structural advantage vs. 2024	Youth demographic surge, party disillusionment	Medium-High

# 1. GHANA ELECTORAL LANDSCAPE — 2024 BASELINE

## 1.1 The 2024 Election Results

The December 2024 general election provides the most accurate baseline for 2028 planning. The results reveal both the depth of the two-party grip and the structural opportunities that an independent campaign can exploit.

Candidate	Party/Status	Votes	% Share
John Dramani Mahama	NDC (Winner)	6,591,790	56.42%
Mahamudu Bawumia	NPP	4,877,611	41.75%
Nana Kwame Bediako	Independent	88,944	0.76%
Alan Kyerematen	Independent	32,457	0.28%
All other candidates	Combined	92,681	0.79%
TOTAL VALID VOTES		11,683,483	100%

### CRITICAL OBSERVATION

The two best-resourced independent candidates in 2024 — Bediako and Kyerematen — combined for just over 1% of the vote despite significant public profiles and campaign spending. This is the foundational challenge this study addresses.

## 1.2 The Floating Voter Analysis — The Real Battlefield

Historical analysis of Ghanaian elections from 1992 to 2024 reveals a consistent pattern: NDC and NPP each hold a loyalty floor of approximately 40% of votes cast. The decisive vote — historically 15–20% of total votes — comes from floating voters with no fixed party affiliation.

Election Year	NDC %	NPP %	Floating/Other %	Turnout %
2008	47.9%	49.8%	2.3%	69.5%
2012	50.7%	47.7%	1.6%	79.4%
2016	44.4%	53.8%	1.8%	68.6%
2020	47.4%	51.6%	1.0%	79.0%
2024	56.4%	41.7%	1.9%	60.9%

**The 2024 election introduces two significant anomalies that create the structural opening for 2028:**

- Voter turnout dropped sharply from 79% (2020) to 60.9% (2024) — approximately 2.1 million registered voters who voted in 2020 did not vote in 2024. These are the demobilised voters an independent movement must reactivate.
- Youth voters aged 18–35 constitute 55.1% of the electorate — over 10 million registered voters. This demographic has the lowest party loyalty intensity and the highest disillusionment rate with both NDC and NPP.

### 1.3 Why Previous Independents Failed — The Bediako Case Study

Nana Kwame Bediako (Cheddar) ran the most prominent independent campaign in Ghana's recent history. His failure at 0.76% is instructive, not discouraging, because his weaknesses are correctable with the right structure.

Bediako Weakness	What It Reveals	2028 Correction
No grassroots constituency infrastructure	Brand awareness ≠ votes	3-year cell-building in all 276 constituencies
No parliamentary candidate slate	Voters had no 'down-ballot' home	Independent bloc with 50+ parliamentary candidates
Late entry into structured campaigning	Insufficient ground operation time	Movement begins 3 years pre-election
No community value delivery	Movement felt abstract, not real	Tangible skills, grants, services from Year 1
Single-candidate personality focus	No movement identity beyond him	Movement brand precedes and outlasts candidate
No floating voter capture strategy	No systematic defection plan	Targeted messaging for NDC/NPP soft voters

## 2. THE MATHEMATICAL PATHWAY TO VICTORY

### 2.1 What Victory Requires

Ghana's constitution requires a presidential candidate to win more than 50% of valid votes cast. Based on 2024 data and projected 2028 turnout, the winning vote threshold is modelled as follows:

Scenario	Projected Turnout	Votes Cast	50%+1 Threshold
Conservative (60% turnout)	60%	11.2 million	5.6 million
Base case (65% turnout)	65%	12.2 million	6.1 million
High turnout (70%)	70%	13.1 million	6.55 million

#### TARGET

The campaign must be built to secure a minimum of 6.0 million votes in the base case scenario. This is the non-negotiable operational target. Every resource allocation decision flows from this number.

### 2.2 The Three-Source Vote Model

Reaching 6 million votes from an independent start requires assembling votes from three distinct sources simultaneously:

Vote Source	Target Votes	Strategy	Difficulty
Floating voters (no party affiliation)	2,300,000	Economic narrative, candidate credibility	Medium
Demobilised 2024 non-voters reactivated	1,500,000	Youth outreach, community activation	Medium
NDC soft voter defection (disillusioned)	1,200,000	Performance failure narrative	Hard
NPP soft voter defection (disillusioned)	900,000	Economic failure, reform narrative	Hard
New 2028 first-time voters captured	400,000	Youth digital campaign, universities	Medium
TOTAL TARGET	6,300,000		

This model is achievable but demanding. Each source requires a different message, different channel, and different community infrastructure. This is why the 3-year runway is not a luxury — it is the minimum viable timeline.

## 2.3 The Regional Battleground Map

Not all 16 regions are equal. The campaign must concentrate resources on high-population, high-floating-voter, or historically-competitive regions while maintaining presence everywhere.

Region	2024 Voter Count	Priority Tier	Key Opportunity
Greater Accra	3,200,000+	TIER 1 — Critical	Largest electorate, high youth %, floating voters
Ashanti	2,400,000+	TIER 1 — Critical	NPP stronghold — defection target, not win target
Eastern	1,400,000+	TIER 2 — Important	Swing potential, competitive history
Western	1,100,000+	TIER 2 — Important	Resources-aware electorate, economic messaging
Central	1,050,000+	TIER 2 — Important	Historically competitive
Northern	950,000+	TIER 2 — Important	Multi-ethnic, high disillusionment
Volta	850,000+	TIER 3 — Maintain	NDC stronghold — suppress turnout, not win
Brong-Ahafo / Bono	900,000+	TIER 2 — Important	Rural economic pain, responsive to jobs narrative
All remaining 8 regions	~3,000,000	TIER 3 — Presence	Maintain credibility, harvest floating voters

## 3. STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR VICTORY

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### 3.1 Why 2028 Is Structurally Different

The 2028 election will occur in a fundamentally different structural context from all previous elections. Five conditions combine to make independent viability higher than at any previous point in Ghana's democratic history:

- **Youth demographic dominance:** By 2028, voters under 35 will constitute over 57% of the registered electorate. This generation has lower tribal-party loyalty, higher disillusionment with both parties, and is the most reachable through owned media channels.
- **Economic credibility collapse:** Both NDC and NPP have now each governed for multiple terms against the backdrop of IMF bailouts, currency depreciation, and graduate unemployment above 30%. Voters who defended one party's economic record can no longer do so without confronting their own lived experience.
- **2024 turnout collapse as a signal:** The 18-percentage-point drop in turnout from 2020 to 2024 is not voter apathy — it is latent protest. These 2.1 million demobilised voters are the most activatable constituency in Ghana's electoral history.
- **Social media penetration:** Ghana's internet and smartphone penetration has grown significantly. By 2028, an independent campaign can reach millions of voters daily at a cost fraction of what traditional party machinery requires, bypassing media gatekeepers entirely.
- **Parliamentary independent precedent:** Four independent candidates won parliamentary seats in 2024. This normalises the concept of voting independent down-ballot and creates the psychological gateway to doing the same at presidential level.

### 3.2 The Candidate Viability Criteria

For an independent candidacy to be viable — not just credible — the candidate must satisfy all five of the following criteria. This section provides the framework for assessing the specific candidate against each criterion.

Criterion	Minimum Threshold	Why It Matters
Name recognition	60%+ national awareness	Unknown candidates cannot build 6M votes in 3 years
Cross-regional appeal	Credible presence in min. 10 of 16 regions	Regional candidates become tribal candidates
Economic credibility	Demonstrated sector competence	Voters need to trust they are electing a capable leader, not a protest symbol
Untainted record	No significant corruption or governance scandals	Parties will weaponise any vulnerability — the independence narrative requires moral authority

Criterion	Minimum Threshold	Why It Matters
Coachable on politics	Willingness to run a disciplined political operation	Celebrity candidates fail when they resist strategic discipline

## 4. RISKS AND MITIGATION

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### 4.1 Risk Register

Risk	Probability	Impact	Mitigation
Party cash flooding constituencies pre-election	Very High	Critical	3-year community value delivery builds loyalty that cash cannot easily override in 3 weeks
Tribal/regional fragmentation of movement	High	Critical	Deliberate multi-ethnic leadership at every tier; movement brand precedes candidate brand
EC procedural obstacles for nomination	Medium	High	Legal team from Year 1; 276 cells double as signature collection infrastructure
Media blackout by partisan outlets	Medium	High	Owned media infrastructure (YouTube, FM, WhatsApp) built from Day 1
Funding shortfall or investor withdrawal	Medium	Critical	Syndicated fund structure; no single investor > 25% of total; international co-funding
Candidate personal scandal or controversy	Low-Medium	Critical	Early opposition research and crisis communications protocol
Runoff scenario (no first-round majority)	Medium	Medium	Campaign modelled to win outright; runoff strategy prepared as contingency

### 4.2 The Runoff Scenario

If no candidate achieves 50%+1 in the first round, Ghana's constitution requires a runoff between the top two candidates. The campaign must be designed with this contingency in mind.

- For a runoff to be triggered, the independent candidate must place in the top two — displacing either NDC or NPP. This is itself a historic achievement and a viable target.
- In a runoff scenario, the independent candidate would face the surviving party candidate with all other party voters available for mobilisation. The movement's cross-party support makes the runoff scenario potentially stronger than the first round.
- Campaign financial modelling must include a runoff reserve budget of approximately \$2–3M USD over the base campaign cost.

## 5. FUNDING REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS

### 5.1 Budget Architecture

The following cost model is based on 2024 Ghanaian electoral cost data, regional logistics, and comparative analysis of serious presidential campaigns in comparable African democracies.

Budget Line	Year 1 (USD)	Year 2 (USD)	Year 3 (USD)	Total (USD)
Constituency cells (276 coordinators)	500,000	900,000	1,200,000	2,600,000
Regional command structure (16 regions)	400,000	600,000	800,000	1,800,000
Media — digital, radio, outdoor	300,000	700,000	2,000,000	3,000,000
Candidate travel and logistics	200,000	400,000	800,000	1,400,000
Community value delivery programme	600,000	1,000,000	400,000	2,000,000
Polling agents (33,000 on election day)	0	0	2,500,000	2,500,000
Legal, electoral compliance, admin	200,000	300,000	500,000	1,000,000
Events, rallies, materials	100,000	300,000	800,000	1,200,000
Contingency (10%)	230,000	420,000	1,000,000	1,650,000
TOTAL	2,530,000	4,620,000	10,000,000	17,150,000

#### INVESTOR NOTE

The front-loaded community delivery spend in Year 1 and Year 2 (\$1.6M combined) is not campaign expenditure — it is infrastructure investment. It builds the movement's credibility, community trust, and voter loyalty that cannot be replicated by cash distribution in the final weeks before election day. This is the campaign's primary competitive moat against party machinery.

### 5.2 Funding Source Architecture

To protect the candidate's independence credentials and distribute investor risk, funding must come from three streams simultaneously — no single stream should exceed 40% of total funds raised.

Funding Stream	Target (USD)	% of Total	Vehicle
Ghana Independence Fund (domestic syndicate)	8,000,000	47%	Formal investment trust; 10-15 investors; \$500K–\$2M each
Diaspora giving (UK, US, EU, Canada)	4,000,000	23%	Monthly pledge model; diaspora chapters; online platform
International pro-democracy foundations	3,000,000	17%	NDI, Open Society, IRI, African Democracy Fund grants
Small donor campaign (grassroots)	1,500,000	9%	Movement members; GHS 50–500 pledges; digital collection
Candidate own resources / network	650,000	4%	Seed funding for Year 1 before fund is structured
<b>TOTAL TARGET</b>	<b>17,150,000</b>	<b>100%</b>	

## 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1 Feasibility Verdict

#### VERDICT: VIABLE WITH CONDITIONS

An independent presidential victory in Ghana 2028 is mathematically and structurally feasible. It is not probable under current conditions. Probability becomes medium-to-high only if all five conditions below are met simultaneously. The conditions are demanding but achievable within the 3-year window.

### 6.2 The Five Conditions for Viability

Condition	Requirement	Status
1. Candidate credibility	Known public figure with 60%+ name recognition and untainted record	To be confirmed via commissioned poll
2. Infrastructure built	All 276 constituency cells operational by Month 18	Requires immediate start
3. Funding secured	\$4M+ committed before campaign launch, full \$17M by Month 24	Ghana Independence Fund must be structured now
4. Movement launched	Narrative campaign and civic org active by Month 3	Requires immediate registration and seed funding
5. Parliamentary slate	Minimum 50 independent parliamentary candidates aligned with movement	Recruitment begins Month 6

### 6.3 Immediate Next Actions

The following actions must be completed before any larger resource commitment is justified:

- Commission independent polling:** Candidate recognition, approval rating, and voter openness to independent candidacy. Budget: \$15,000–\$30,000. Timeline: 6 weeks.
- Register civic organisation:** Legally incorporate the movement as a civil society organisation (not a political party). Budget: \$2,000–\$5,000. Timeline: 4 weeks.
- Assemble legal team:** Electoral law specialists for EC requirements, funding structure, and compliance. Budget: \$10,000 retainer. Timeline: 2 weeks.
- Structure Ghana Independence Fund:** Engage trust lawyers to establish the formal investment vehicle. Simultaneous with first investor conversations. Budget: \$5,000–\$10,000 setup. Timeline: 8 weeks.

5. **Produce the Campaign Prospectus:** The investor-grade document that presents this feasibility study alongside team bios, governance structure, and investment terms. This document is the door to every serious funding conversation.

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*Prepared by: Cedimaker Strategic Advisory | March 2025*